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IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF NO ONE:
HOW NEW YORK’S “BEST INTERESTS OF
THE CHILD” LAW VIOLATES PARENTS’
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO THE CARE,
CUSTODY, AND CONTROL OF THEIR
CHILDREN
NICOLE LAPSATIS†
INTRODUCTION
The only permanent rule in the game of Calvinball is that
you can never play the game with the same rule twice.1 Calvin, a
six-year-old imaginative comic figure from Bill Watterson’s
famous comic, Calvin and Hobbes,2 created Calvinball with the
intention of making a game that could not be more disorganized.3
Any player may declare a new rule at any point in the game.4
Zones on the playing field are created “spontaneously and
inconsistently by players.”5 Score does not need to be kept with
any logical consistency.6 Penalties may be in any form deemed
fit.7 And, “[a]ny rule that is carried out during the course of the
game may never be used again.”8
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1
See 2 BILL WATTERSON, THE COMPLETE CALVIN AND HOBBES 292 (2005).
2
Id. at 1.
3
See id. at 268–73.
4
See id. at 273.
5
Calvinball and Calvinball Rules, The Official Rules of Calvinball,
http://www.insaner.com/calvinball/rules.html (last visited on Jan. 31, 2013). Zones
may also disappear and appear whenever a player decides. See id.
6
See WATTERSON, supra note 1, at 292 (noting that score can be kept with both
letters and numbers—“The score is still Q to 12!”).
7
See Calvinball and Calvinball Rules, supra note 5.
8
Id.
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While a game with no rules is exactly the type of fictional
game a six-year-old boy wants to play with his talking stuffed
animal, it is hardly the type of playing field parents want to
engage in when litigating their most fundamental rights. Yet
New York family law has adopted the Calvinball approach in
determining custody disputes.
There is no determinative
standard governing the allocation of custody. Judges may
declare whatever factors they want to consider and may consider
new factors at any point in the litigation. They need not
attribute weight to every factor or even allot consistent degrees of
weight to each factor. And no two judges need to follow the same
approach or come to the same result.
Results in custody disputes, however, go far beyond losing a
game of Calvinball, to the infringement of a parent’s
constitutional right. Parents, whether they were once married or
not,9 have a fundamental constitutional right to the care,
custody, and control of their children.10 An award of sole legal
custody assigns one parent the right to make decisions
concerning the child,11 and takes away the other parent’s right to
engage in “decision-making authority and responsibility about
larger issues, most typically healthcare, education and religion.”12
The custodial parent has “final say” over decisions concerning the
upbringing of the child, and the non-custodial parent is forced to
remain absent from involvement in the child’s upbringing,13
ultimately stripping the non-custodial parent of his or her
constitutional right.
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized
that individuals are “entitled to constitutional protection—
regarding . . . decisions concerning the upbringing of their
children, and the retention of their children through the exercise
of custody.”14 Like all other fundamental constitutional rights, a
9

See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1972).
See infra note 14.
11
See Russell I. Marnell, Joint Custody in New York: A Statute Whose Time Has
Come?, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 26, 1995, at 7, available at http://www.marnelllaw.com/
downloads/new_york_law_april_1995.pdf.
12
Joy S. Rosenthal, An Argument for Joint Custody as an Option for All Family
Court Mediation Program Participants, 11 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 127, 146 (2007).
13
Id.
14
Holly L. Robinson, Joint Custody: Constitutional Imperatives, 54 U. CIN. L.
REV. 27, 40 (1985); see, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65–66 (2000); Hodgson
v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 445–46 (1990); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 257–59
(1983) (recognizing the Constitutional protection afforded to a parent’s right in the
10
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parent’s right to the care, custody, and control of his or her child
cannot be deprived unless the state has established a compelling
interest15 and there is no less restrictive means of achieving that
interest.16 The state cannot justify infringing on the “the private
realm of family life” based on arbitrary legislative action, without
any purpose, and without regard to the child’s well-being.17
Contrary to Supreme Court precedent, New York’s
Calvinball-like standard for determining custody disputes,
absent child abuse, neglect, and domestic violence, works to
violate parents’ fundamental right to the care, custody, and
control of their children without a compelling justification for
doing so. New York is a “best interests” state. New York’s
Domestic Relations Law §240 states that any court considering
questions of custody must determine what is in “the best
interests of the child.”18 This “statutory mandate is deliberately
broad” and provides no concrete guidance as to what a court
should consider when determining a child’s best interests.19 The
law leaves entirely in the judge’s discretion the power to create
and modify the general rules that apply to custody disputes.20
Even in light of the criteria that courts have developed, the “best
interests of the child” test permits courts to consider a number of
custody, care, and upbringing of his or her child); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602
(1979); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (noting that the primary role of
parents in the upbringing of their children “is now established beyond debate as an
enduring American tradition”).
15
See Robinson, supra note 14, at 56; see also Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l,
431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977) (requiring a compelling state interest to justify burdens on
right to obtain contraceptives); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (requiring that
state show compelling interests to justify interference with women’s right to
abortion).
16
See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965); Roe, 410 U.S. at 163
(rejecting a statute burdening abortion rights because the statute was not drawn
narrowly enough to protect only compelling state interests); see also Lois Shepherd,
Looking Forward with the Right of Privacy, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 251, 263 (2001)
(explaining that once a right is determined to be fundamental, the state is required
to show a compelling state interest and that the regulation is narrowly tailored).
17
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
18
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240 (West, Westlaw through L.2011, chs. 1–54, 57–
495).
19
Alan D. Scheinkman, Custody and Visitation, in 12 N.Y. PRAC. NEW YORK
LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 21:13 (West 2009) [hereinafter Custody and
Visitation].
20
See Mary Ann Glendon, Fixed Rules and Discretion in Contemporary Family
Law and Succession Law, 60 TUL. L. REV. 1165, 1171 (1986). That discretion can
potentially produce a coherent body of law only if judges were to be instructed on a
desirable outcome. See id.
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non-binding factors, and there are no clear and definite
guidelines instructing the courts how to determine what is
actually in the best interests of the child.
In theory, a judge, guided by judicially created criteria, will
use his or her discretion to determine what custody arrangement
is truly the best for each child.21 The Legislature has determined
that the only way for courts to “decide each individual case on its
own facts” is through an indefinite standard.22 But case law
suggests that under the imprecise system that the Legislature
has allowed to exist, a judge may exercise unrestrained
discretion “in a manner that permits decision-making based upon
value judgments and bias.”23 A judge, acting under the protective
cloak of the “best interests of the child” rule, could not only grant
custody to one parent, but, at the same time, could take away a
fit parent’s custodial right without actually determining that it is
in the child’s best interest to do so. There is no guarantee that
judges will “tailor the decision to justly fit the particular
circumstances” of a case.24 And there is certainly no guarantee
that a custody arrangement, driven by whatever the judge
considers to be a better familial situation, will promote the child’s
best interests.25

21
See Custody and Visitation, supra note 19 (proposing that the best interests of
the child standard does not need to offer much real guidance because the court
should, at all times, be concerned with and should strive to do what is best for the
child).
22
Id.
23
Leah A. Hill, Do You See What I See? Reflections on How Bias Infiltrates the
New York City Family Court—the Case of the Court Ordered Investigation, 40
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 527, 535 (2007); see also Robinson, supra note 14, at 59
(“Such a standard is extremely susceptible to a judge’s personal value judgments
regarding what is best for children, since the intended content of the term ‘best’ is
not defined.”).
24
See Custody and Visitation, supra note 19.
25
In fact, there is more of a guarantee that the wide discretion afforded to
judges in custody disputes limits a parent’s ability to get a tenuous decision
overturned. See discussion infra Part III.A.3. The ill-defined “best interests of the
child” standard works to protect a trial court’s decision, regardless of whether the
decision is driven by personal value judgments and biases and is really not in the
best interests of the child.
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The problem of potentially biased decision-making, whether
it is intentional or unintentional,26 is aggravated by the challenge
of gathering and analyzing complete information about each
child’s situation in New York custody proceedings. There is a
myriad of problems with the process of deciding custody disputes
in both New York family and supreme courts.27 The Matrimonial
Commission (“Commission”), in its report to the Chief Judge of
the State of New York, noted that many improvements need to be
made in administering divorces, including several areas that
affect custody disputes.28
The Commission recognized the
“extremely heavy caseloads” in matrimonial parts and the close
monitoring required in all matrimonial matters and supported
the need for additional assistance and resources in these parts.29
The Commission acknowledged that the “administration,
resource and facilities issues . . . are not limited to matrimonial
parts”; rather, family courts toil with these problems as well.30
In light of all the constraints affecting the court systems and the
conditions under which judges determine issues of custody,
judges face a huge obstacle in evaluating and deciding what is
truly in the best interests of the child.

26
A judge’s use of personal biases and value judgments is not always
necessarily an intentional action; rather, because of the ambiguity of the “best
interests of the child” rule, a judge is put in a position where he or she may have to
rely on personal value judgments to fill the gaps of the “best interests” rule.
27
Family courts have exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving custody,
visitation, child support, guardianship of children, abuse and neglect, support,
paternity, foster care, and termination of parental rights to guardianship and
custody of children. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 115 (West, Westlaw through L.2006).
Proceedings brought to annul a marriage, for separation, or for divorce are heard in
New York State supreme courts. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240 (West, Westlaw
through L.2011). Therefore, parents who are unmarried must litigate disputes
regarding their children in family court, while parents who are married must
litigate disputes regarding their children, stemming from a divorce, separation, or
annulment, in supreme court.
28
Sondra Miller, Appendix A: Matrimonial Commission of the State of New
York, Report to the Chief Judge of the State of New York, 27 PACE L. REV. 987, 987
(2007) [hereinafter Matrimonial Commission Report] (recommending many changes
in several areas including the selection and education of judges, the administration
of the legal process, the appointment and regulations of experts and law guardians,
access to the justice system, the pursuance of research in the area of family law, and
the increase in public awareness and education regarding the rights of parties
engaged in divorce and custody matters).
29
Id. at 1018–19.
30
Id. at 1020.
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Custody disputes, however, would be better and more
consistently decided if a joint custody presumption was adopted
in New York. New York “remains one of a rapidly diminishing
number of states without a statute for joint custody.”31 A statute
requiring a presumption of joint custody is exactly what New
York needs—one that protects parents’ right to the care, custody,
and control of their children, all the while adequately ensuring a
child’s best interests. Under this joint custody presumption,
judges would have to presume that joint legal custody must be
awarded unless the state has a compelling justification not to
grant joint custody. A state, acting under the doctrine of parens
patriae, has an obligation to protect the interests and welfare of
children.32 A state, however, cannot protect a child’s right to the
extent that it infringes on another individual’s fundamental right
without a compelling justification for doing so.33 There must be a
finding of some detriment or harm to the child as a result of joint
custody in order to justify granting exclusive custody to one
parent and stripping the other parent of all custodial and
decision-making rights.
This Note argues that New York State’s procedure for
determining custody disputes allows a judge to abridge parents’
fundamental right to the care, custody, and control of their
children without evidence of a compelling justification.
Specifically, this Note argues that because of New York’s
nebulous standard for determining what is the best interest of
the child, more often than not, a judge is forced to substitute
personal value judgments and biases to compensate for the lack
of clear guidance provided to judges in order to determine what is
in the child’s best interests. A judge, after attempting to
overcome the systemic barriers resulting from custody courts,
can decide to grant sole custody to one parent over another based
on certain considerations that genuinely do not affect the best
interests of the child.
Part I discusses a parent’s fundamental constitutional right
to the care, custody, and control of his or her child and the
requisite justification to infringe on that right. Part II defines
31

Marnell, supra note 11.
See infra notes 100, 183–85 and accompanying text.
33
See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758–59 (1982) (noting that a state’s
countervailing interests must be weighed against the loss a parent would suffer as a
result of the state’s infringement on his or her fundamental right).
32
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New York’s “best interests of the child” rule. Part III analyzes
the ways in which the “best interests of the child” rule actually
operates in determining custody disputes when there is no
allegation of child abuse, neglect, or domestic violence. This Part
addresses all the shortcomings in implementing New York’s “best
interests of the child” test, including the administrative burdens
a judge faces in determining what custodial arrangement would
most benefit the child’s interests. Lastly, Part IV advocates for a
solution that would address all the impediments of New York’s
“best interests of the child” test—a default presumption in favor
of a joint custodial relationship.
Part IV argues that a
presumption in favor of joint legal custody, absent any proof of
detriment or harm to the child, would operate to both protect a
parent’s fundamental right to the care, custody, and control of his
or her child and protect the child’s best interests.
I.

PARENTHOOD IS A FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT

When deciding issues of custody, most judges refer to their
decisions as the “awarding” or “granting” of custody.34 Contrary
to its implication, an “award” of custody is not a reward of a right
above and beyond what each parent is entitled to; it confirms a
fundamental right already vested in the parent.
Parents’
interests in the care, custody, and control of their children are
“perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests
recognized by [the Supreme Court]” and protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment from unjustified infringement by the
state.35
The Supreme Court has established “extensive
precedent” regarding the cardinal rights of parents over their
children.36 Stemming from the Court’s decision in Meyer v.
Nebraska,37 it is now recognized that parents, by virtue of their

34
See, e.g., Dewitt v. Sheiness, 42 A.D.3d 776, 777–78, 840 N.Y.S.2d 208, 209–
10 (3d Dep’t 2007) (finding that the trial court had sound and substantial basis for
granting ex-husband custody of child); Allain v. Allain, 35 A.D.3d 513, 514, 826
N.Y.S.2d 411, 412 (2d Dep’t 2006) (finding that the lower court’s “determination
awarding sole custody of the parties’ son to the father has a sound and substantial
basis in the record.”); Smulczeski v. Smulczeski, 18 A.D.3d 734, 735, 797 N.Y.S.2d
97, 98 (2d Dep’t 2005) (“The record supports the Supreme Court's conclusion that
awarding the defendant custody of the parties' two children was in the best interest
of the children . . . .”).
35
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).
36
Id. at 66.
37
262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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status as a parent,38 “possess a fundamental liberty interest—
entitled to constitutional protection—regarding . . . decisions
concerning the upbringing of their children, and the retention of
their children through the exercise of custody.”39
Absent
“powerful countervailing interest[s]” concerning the child’s wellbeing, a parent’s right to the care, custody, and control of his or
her child cannot be taken away or infringed upon.40
A.

Parents’ Well-Established Constitutional Right to the Care,
Custody, and Control of Their Children

Early Supreme Court cases dealing with the issue of
parental rights focused on a parent’s constitutional right to make
decisions regarding his or her child’s upbringing and well-being.41
In Meyer, the Court invalidated an act that forbade the teaching
of languages other than English to students that had not passed
the eighth grade.42 The Court reasoned that the “liberty”
interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment include the
rights of parents to “bring up [their] children”43 and “control the
education of their own.”44 The Court recognized that a parent
retains a constitutional right to be the arbiter of questions that
concern his or her child’s well-being. If a parent wants to enroll
his or her child in a certain school, or teach the child a different
language, the parent is entitled to do so as long as his or her
decision is not harmful to the child.45 This liberty interest “may
38

See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (emphasizing the importance
of the family and the essential “basic civil rights of man” to “conceive and to raise
one’s children” (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)) (citing
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923))).
39
Robinson, supra note 14.
40
Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651.
41
Although early on the Court had not specifically coined the term “care,
custody, and control,” the Court was implicitly referring to a parent’s fundamental
right to maintain custody over his or her child by declaring that parents have a
constitutional right to make decisions concerning their child’s well-being. It is only
through the exercise of legal custody that a parent would be involved in making
decisions concerning the child’s well-being. See supra note 11 and accompanying
text. Therefore, the Court’s early holdings regarding a parent’s right to make
decisions concerning his or her child’s upbringing can be read in accordance with the
Court’s belated adoption of the term “care, custody, and control” to describe a
parent’s fundamental parental right.
42
See 262 U.S. at 397, 402.
43
Id. at 399.
44
Id. at 401.
45
See id. at 400 (finding that within the protected liberty of the Fourteenth
Amendment parents have a fundamental right to undertake their “natural duty” as
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not be interfered with . . . by legislative action which is arbitrary
or without reasonable relation to some purpose within the
competency of the state to effect.”46
Two years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, a case
involving the validity of a state statute that required parents to
send their children to public school,47 the Court confirmed that
the liberty of parents includes the right “to direct the upbringing
and education of children under their control.”48 The Court
explained that “[t]he child is not the mere creature of the state;
those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right,
coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for
additional obligations.”49 A parent’s right to engage in his or her
child’s upbringing includes the right to impress on his or her
child moral standards, religious beliefs, and attributes of a good
citizen.50
Since Pierce, the Court has firmly established that parents
have a fundamental right over the care, custody, and control of
their children, which encompasses a parent’s right to the
upbringing of his or her child. In Prince v. Massachusetts, the
Court declared it a cardinal principle “that the custody, care and
nurture of the child reside first in the parents.”51 A parent’s
“primary function and freedom include[s] preparation for
obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.”52 When it
comes to regulating parental rights, a state’s paramount concern
is whether a parent’s nurturing and care presents a “clear and
present danger” to the child.53 Absent a showing of clear and
present danger, which warrants protection by the state, a parent
has a fundamental right, free from governmental interference, to
retain custody over and raise his or her child.54

parents and enroll their children in any schooling that “cannot reasonably be
regarded as harmful”).
46
Id. at 399–400.
47
268 U.S. 510, 533–34 (1925).
48
Id. at 534–35.
49
Id. at 535.
50
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972).
51
321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
52
Id.
53
Id. at 167.
54
See id.
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The Court again stressed the importance of a parent’s
fundamental right in the care, custody, and control of his or her
child in Stanley v. Illinois.55
In Stanley, the Court held
unconstitutional an Illinois statute that presumed that every
father of a child born out of wedlock was unfit to have custody of
his children, making the child an automatic ward of the state
upon his or her mother’s death.56 In Stanley, there was nothing
in the record to indicate that the father had not cared for or
neglected his children.57 For that reason, the Court considered
the effect of the statute on the children—taking the children from
their suitable father and placing them in the hands of the state—
emphasizing “the importance of the family” and the essentialness
of a parent’s right to “raise one’s children.”58 It was evident to
the Court in Stanley that a parent’s right to the “care, custody,
and management of his or her children” is a substantial right
that “undeniably warrants deference” and protection.59
Accordingly, the statute’s automatic destruction of the father’s
custodial right without the court considering his fitness, violated
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.60
The notion that parents’ rights require firm deference was
affirmed in Santosky v. Kramer.61 The Court’s rationale was
based on the “historical recognition that freedom of personal
choice in matters of family life is a fundamental liberty interest
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”62 This fundamental
liberty interest does not evaporate simply because a parent has
not been a model parent.63 Rather, parents faced with the
“dissolution of their parental rights have a . . . critical need for
procedural protections.”64 The state’s countervailing interests
must be weighed against the loss the parent would suffer as a
result of the infringement on his or her fundamental parental

55

405 U.S. 645 (1972).
Id. at 658. The Court held that the father was entitled to a hearing on the
issue of his fitness as a parent before he could be deprived of his children. Id.
57
Id. at 655.
58
Id. at 651.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 658 (concluding that “Illinois parents are constitutionally entitled to a
hearing on their fitness before their children are removed from their custody”).
61
455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id.
56
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right.65 A parent’s right to custody is a powerful interest that can
only be terminated with clear and convincing proof that the
parent is unfit.66 The clear and convincing evidence standard
aims to protect fundamental fairness by minimizing the risk of
erroneous decisions and providing litigants with a means of
estimating risk of error.67 Therefore, even though the Court
recognized that parental rights are not without limitations,68
Santosky fortified the boundaries of parental rights, and limited
the state’s authority to impose on those rights.
B.

A State Cannot Deprive Parents of Their Fundamental Right
Without a Compelling Justification

The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall
“deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.”69 The Supreme Court has long recognized that
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause provides
heightened protection against government interference with
fundamental liberty interests.70 The Due Process Clause does not
permit a state to infringe on the fundamental right of parents
“simply because a state judge believes a ‘better’ decision could be
made.”71 The state must demonstrate that deprivation of the
right in question is necessary to accomplish a compelling state
interest,72 and that there is no less restrictive method of
protecting that interest.73
A parent’s right to the care, custody, and control of his or her
child is so fundamental that nothing short of a detrimental
impact on the child’s well-being could trump the parent’s
fundamental right. A heightened level of scrutiny must be
applied in all cases considering any sort of infringement on
65

See id. at 758.
See id. at 747–48.
67
See id. at 757, 757 n.9, 767–68.
68
The Court noted that the state has “a parens patriae interest in preserving
and promoting the welfare of the child.” Id. at 766.
69
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
70
See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (explaining that the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause not only guarantees fair process, it
includes a substantive component that requires heightened protection against
government interference with an individual’s fundamental rights and liberty
interests).
71
Id. at 72–73.
72
See supra note 14.
73
See supra note 15.
66
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fundamental parental rights. The Court demonstrated the
importance of parental rights in Troxel v. Granville, where it
found that even a limited infringement involving a close
relative’s right to visit with a child does not overcome the
parent’s fundamental decision-making right without a compelling
justification.74 In Troxel, a case involving a dispute between a
mother and her daughters’ paternal grandparents who were
seeking visitation,75 the Court found that a Washington State law
granting grandparents visitation rights was unconstitutional as
applied to the facts of the case.76 In finding that the Washington
superior court improperly awarded visitation to the children’s
grandparents, the Court reasoned that the visitation order was
“not founded on any special factors that might justify the State’s
interference with [the mother’s] fundamental right to make
decisions concerning the rearing of her two daughters.”77 The
superior court, instead of attributing any weight to the mother’s
position that visitation was not in her children’s best interests,78
based its decision on two “slender findings” regarding the
potential—and far-fetched—benefits the grandparents may
provide in the “areas of cousins and music.”79 The superior court
even considered the judge’s own personal experiences growing up
and “spend[ing] . . . a week with one set of grandparents and
[then] another set of grandparents.”80 However, two slender
findings in support of visitation and a judge’s own childhood
experiences visiting her grandparents, without any consideration

74

Troxel, 530 U.S. at 63.
Id. at 60–61. The grandparents petitioned for visitation soon after the death
of their son—the children’s father. Id.
76
Id. at 73 (finding that because the Washington statute did not place any
limits on the persons who may petition for visitation or the circumstances in which
the petition may be granted, the statute was unconstitutional). The Washington
statute provided: “Any person may petition the court for visitation rights at any time
including, but not limited to, custody proceedings. The court may order visitation
rights for any person when visitation may serve the best interest of the child
whether or not there has been any change of circumstances. ” Id. at 61 (citing WASH.
REV. CODE § 26.10.160(3) (1994)). The statute does not require that a court accord a
parent’s decision any weight whatsoever. Id. at 67. On the other hand, the statute
“places the best-interest determination solely in the hands of the judge.” Id.
77
Id. at 68.
78
See id. at 72.
79
Id. (quoting Joint Appendix at 70a, In re Troxel, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (No. 99138), 1999 WL 35032656, at *70a).
80
Id. (quoting Verbatim Report of Proceedings at 220–21, In Re Troxel, No.
933006507 (Wash. Super. Ct. Dec. 14, 19, 1994)).
75
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of the fit custodial parent’s admonition, proved to be insufficient
state interests to infringe on the mother’s right to the care,
custody, and control of her daughters.81
In contrast, the Court has found a compelling justification to
abridge parental rights when issues have arisen concerning a
child’s well-being. A state “is not without constitutional control
over parental discretion in dealing with children when their
physical or mental health is jeopardized.”82 A state may burden
the childrearing right of parents to protect the physical, mental,
and emotional health of children. For example, in Prince v.
Massachusetts, the Court recognized that a state could require a
compulsory vaccination for a child in order to protect the child’s
health and safeguard the child from exposure to some
communicable disease.83 When balancing the state’s interests
against the rights at stake, it is evident that there is certainly a
“powerful countervailing interest”84 for the state to protect a child
from an apparent and substantial detriment to the child’s health
and well-being. But, as stressed in the Court’s opinion in
Santosky, there is a difference between a parent that is not per se
a “model parent” and a parent that is unfit and may be
detrimental to the child’s well-being.85 The Court has never
construed the state’s power to include the authority to infringe on
a parent’s right when the parent has demonstrated sufficient

81

See id. at 75.
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979); see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 233–34 (1972) (finding that the power of a parent to raise his or her child
may be subject to limitation if it appears that the parent’s decisions “will jeopardize
the health or safety of the child, or have a potential for significant social burdens”).
83
321 U.S. 158, 166–67 (1944) (explaining that even a parent’s freedom of
conscience and religious practice claim does not nullify a state’s right to intervene
and protect the child’s health); see also Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166–
67 (1878) (holding that the family is not beyond regulations in the public interest
against a claim of religious liberty); see, e.g., Wright v. DeWitt Sch. Dist. No. 1, 385
S.W.2d 644, 645–46 (1965) (finding that the plaintiffs, members of a religious
organization, did not have a right to resist on religious grounds the enforcement of a
health care regulation that required all children to be vaccinated against smallpox
before attending the defendant’s school).
84
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
85
See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
82
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commitment to his or her child’s well-being, regardless if the
court does or does not necessarily agree with the parent’s
parenting decisions.86
The state may also take certain measures to ensure that
other aspects of a child’s well-being, aside from health, are
adequately provided for. In order “to guard the general interest
in youth’s well being, the state . . . may restrict the parent’s
control by requiring school attendance [and] regulating or
prohibiting the child’s labor.”87 The state has a highly ranked
interest in educating its citizens and, accordingly, can impose
reasonable regulations for the control of basic education.88 That
being said, even the state’s paramount responsibility of educating
its citizens has been “made to yield to the right of parents” to
enroll their children in privately-operated schools if they so
choose.89 A parent’s right to engage in the rearing of his or her
child, specifically “the values of parental direction of the religious
upbringing and education of their children,” continues to
maintain a high place in our society even relative to a state’s
compelling interests.90
II. NEW YORK’S “BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD” RULE DEFINED
The “best interests of the child” rule is both codified in New
York statute and expanded upon in New York case law. The
“best interests of the child” standard gained prominence in New
York in 1925 following Judge Cardozo’s pioneering custody
opinion in Finlay v. Finlay,91 but became the “focal point” of
custody disputes in 1962 when Domestic Relations Law §240 was
enacted.92 Today, section 240 governs the way custody should be
86

See, e.g., Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 447 (1990) (“A natural parent
who has demonstrated sufficient commitment to his or her children is thereafter
entitled to raise the children free from undue state interference.”).
87
Prince, 321 U.S. at 166. The Prince Court upheld a state statute limiting child
labor, despite claims that the state could not exercise control over child labor
because of constitutionally protected parental authority. See id. at 168–70.
88
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972).
89
Id. (discussing the Court’s holding in Pierce).
90
See id. at 213–14. However important a state’s interest is in universal
education, it is not “free from a balancing process” when it impinges on the
traditional interests of parents to engage in the upbringing of their own. See id. at
214.
91
240 N.Y. 429, 148 N.E. 624 (1925).
92
See Joel R. Brandes, Judging the “Best Interests of the Child”, N.Y. L.J., Feb.
23, 1999, at 3.
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decided in all cases.93 The statute states that a court shall “enter
orders for custody . . . in the court’s discretion . . . having regard
to the circumstances of the case and of the respective parties and
to the best interests of the child.”94 Although the statute requires
courts to consider both the circumstances of the case and the
parties involved, courts have latched on to the “best interests of
the child” requirement, and, currently, the “best interests of the
child” has become the sole overriding criterion cited in custody
decisions.95
Section 240 does not on its own offer much detail as to “best
interests of the child” test. The statute only makes it clear that a
determination of custody is in the judge’s sole discretion.96 The
statute provides no direction as to how a judge should or should
not exercise his or her discretion aside from requiring the judge
to consider the child’s best interests.97 Therefore, most custody
decisions rely on case law in trying to resolve how to decide
custody.98
Over the years, New York courts have attempted to come up
with some general recommendations on how to evaluate the best
interests of the child.
Not steadfast rules, these
93
Section 240 and section 651 of the Family Court Act dictate the rules of
custody disputes in New York; however, section 240 actually articulates the
standard in custody cases. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 651(a)–(b) (West, Westlaw
through L.2011, chs. 1–54, 57–495).
94
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240 (West, Westlaw through L.2010).
95
See Brandes, supra note 92 (“As we enter the 21st century, the ‘best interests’
of the child is the sole criterion for initial and modified custody awards.”); see also
Mohen v. Mohen, 53 A.D.3d 471, 472–73, 862 N.Y.S.2d 75, 77 (2d Dep’t 2008)
(stating that “[t]he essential consideration in making an award of custody is the best
interests of the child”).
96
See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240(1)(a); see also Custody and Visitation, supra
note 19.
97
By statutory mandate, however, a court must consider the effect of domestic
violence upon the best interests of the child if a party makes a sworn allegation that
“the other party has committed an act of domestic violence against the party making
the allegation or a family or household member of either party . . . and such
allegations are proven by a preponderance of the evidence.” N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW
§ 240(1)(a). But even when there are allegations of domestic violence, the statute
simply instructs that the court must consider “the effect of such domestic violence
upon the best interests of the child.” Id. The statute on its face, once again, does not
set forth any guidelines instructing how or to what extent a judge should consider
the domestic violence.
98
Developments in the Law—The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV.
1156, 1327 (1980) (noting that states rely on case-by-case adjudication to give
content to the “best interests of the child” standard) [hereinafter Child Custody
Relations].
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recommendations are continuously modified, expanded, and even
narrowed as custody decisions continue to unfold.99 Currently,
the only set-in-stone rule evident in custody cases is that the
court is the ultimate arbiter of what custody arrangement is in
the child’s best interests.100 Courts, acting under the doctrine of
parens patriae, are supposed to decide what is best for each
child.101 Judges, fully aware of the latitude they enjoy, know that
it is ultimately up to them to say what is in the child’s best
interest and what is not.
The judicially created recommendations consist of a number
of non-binding policies designed to guide judges in determining
what would best promote the child’s interests.102 There are “no
absolutes” in applying these recommendations; judges must
make use of the recommended factors as they see fit.103 These
factors include, but are not limited to, the quality of the home
environment, the ability of each parent to provide for the child’s
emotional and intellectual development, the financial status and
ability of each parent to provide for the child, the relative fitness
of the respective parents, the effect an award of custody might
have on the child’s relationship with the other parent, the length
of time the present custody arrangement has been in effect, and
the desires of the child.104

99
See Custody and Visitation, supra note 19 (explaining that “the caselaw
criteria are not arbitrary and inflexible rules; they are matters to be considered, not
matters to be blindly followed”).
100
See, e.g., Vann v. Vann, 14 A.D.3d 710, 710–11, 789 N.Y.S.2d 261, 262 (2d
Dep’t 2005) (stating that “[c]ustody determinations are ordinarily a matter of
discretion for the hearing court” and that the court’s “paramount concern” is the best
interests of the child) (citations omitted); Zafran v. Zafran, 306 A.D.2d 468, 469, 761
N.Y.S.2d 317, 319 (2d Dep’t 2003) (“In child custody determinations, a court must
decide what is in the best interest of the child, and what will best promote his or her
welfare and happiness.”).
101
See Alan D. Scheinkman, Practice Commentaries, N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 70,
at 7 (West, Westlaw through L.1988).
102
See Eschbach v. Eschbach, 56 N.Y.2d 167, 171, 436 N.E.2d 1260, 1262, 451
N.Y.S.2d 658, 660 (1982) (confirming that the “best interests” factors are “policies
designed not to bind the courts, but to guide them”).
103
Friederwitzer v. Friederwitzer, 55 N.Y.2d 89, 93, 432 N.E.2d 765, 767, 447
N.Y.S.2d 893, 895 (1982).
104
See Eschbach, 56 N.Y.2d at 172–73, 436 N.E.2d at 1263, 451 N.Y.S.2d at
661–62; see also Mohen v. Mohen, 53 A.D.3d 471, 473, 862 N.Y.S.2d 75, 77–78 (2d
Dep’t 2008) (quoting Kaplan v. Kaplan, 21 A.D.3d 993, 994–95, 801 N.Y.S.2d 391,
393 (2d Dep’t 2005)); Kaczor v. Kaczor, 12 A.D.3d 956, 958, 785 N.Y.S.2d 573, 575
(3d Dep’t 2004) (quoting Smith v. Miller, 4 A.D.3d 697, 698, 772 N.Y.S.2d 742, 744
(3d Dep’t 2004)); Zafran, 306 A.D.2d at 469, 761 N.Y.S.2d at 319.
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Judges, who have been left to decide the extent to which the
existence or absence of a particular “best interests” factor will
affect their decision, can liberally apply these factors when
determining custody. In Nehra v. Uhlar, the New York Court of
Appeals, holding that a de facto change in custody was not a
“sufficiently extraordinary [circumstance] to justify upsetting” a
prior judgment of custody,105 was “at pains” trying to make sense
of the actual application of the different “best interests”
considerations.106 Although this case involved a unique set of
facts in which the mother requested a change in custody after she
had abducted the children from the custodial father and
persisted to limit any contact between the father and his children
for four-and-a-half years,107 the court’s decision to change the
prior custody arrangement was still purportedly based on what
would be in the best interests of the children.108 The court made
evident the leniency of actually applying the “best interests”
factors. For every “best interests” factor that was mentioned, the
court carved out some condition to it. Specifically, the court
found that stability is important,109 but the disruption of change
is not necessarily determinative.110 The desires of a child are to
be considered, but these desires can be manipulated by the
parents and may not necessarily be in the child’s best interests.111
If there is a prior custody arrangement, the court explained that
“[p]riority, not as an absolute but as a weighty factor, should, in
the absence of extraordinary circumstances, be accorded to the
first” award of custody or the prior agreement of custody.112
Further, the relative fitness of the parents and the length of time

105

43 N.Y.2d 242, 250, 372 N.E.2d 4, 8, 401 N.Y.S.2d 168, 172 (1977).
Friederwitzer, 55 N.Y.2d at 94, 432 N.E.2d at 767, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 895
(acknowledging the difficulty the Court of Appeals in Nehra was having trying to
point out the factors that need to be considered and the weight or priority that
should be attributed to each factor).
107
See Nehra, 43 N.Y.2d at 246–47, 372 N.E.2d at 6, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 170 (1977).
108
See id. at 246, 372 N.E.2d at 5, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 169.
109
See id. at 250, 372 N.E.2d at 8, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 172 (explaining that in order
to maintain a child’s stability, “continual shifting of custody from one parent to
another is to be avoided when possible”).
110
Id. at 248, 372 N.E.2d at 7, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 171 (reasoning that temporary
disruption to a child’s stability because of a change in custody is not determinative
because all changes in custody are disruptive).
111
See id. at 249, 372 N.E.2d at 7, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 171.
112
Id. at 251, 372 N.E.2d at 9, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 173.
106
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of the present custody arrangement may also be considered.113
Evidently, the weight of each factor is decided on a case-by-case
basis and determined by the presiding judge.
On appeal, the appellate court must consider the totality of
the circumstances in deciding whether to affirm or reverse a trial
court’s determination of what is in the best interest of the
child.114 As a general rule, the existence or absence of any one
factor is not determinative.115 A trial court’s determination will
only be set aside if it lacks a sound and substantial basis.116 Such
a strict standard of review is justified by the hearing court’s
supposed ability to make the best determination of the child’s
best interests because it had the opportunity to assess the
evidence, “the credibility of the witnesses and . . . the character,
temperament, and sincerity of the parties.”117 Accordingly,
appellate courts must place an undue emphasis on what a lower
court determines is in the best interest of the child, effectively
furnishing trial courts with much broader authority in custody
matters.118

113

See id. at 250–51, 372 N.E.2d at 8, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 172–73.
See Eschbach v. Eschbach, 56 N.Y.2d 167, 174, 436 N.E.2d 1260, 1264, 451
N.Y.S.2d 658, 662 (1982) (noting that on appeal a court must consider the totality of
the circumstances rather than the existence or absence of a particular “best
interests” factor).
115
See Friederwitzer v. Friederwitzer, 55 N.Y.2d 89, 93–94, 432 N.E.2d 765,
767, 447 N.Y.S.2d 893, 895 (1982) (instructing that no one factor can be
determinative of whether there should be a change in custody); see also Eschbach, 56
N.Y.2d at 173, 436 N.E.2d at 1263, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 661; Zafran v. Zafran, 306
A.D.2d 468, 469, 761 N.Y.S.2d 317, 319 (2d Dep’t 2003).
116
See John Robert P. v. Vito, 23 A.D.3d 659, 661, 804 N.Y.S.2d 802, 804 (2d
Dep’t 2005); Willis-Marsh v. Wilkerson, 22 A.D.3d 977, 978, 803 N.Y.S.2d 231, 233
(3d Dep’t 2005); Zafran, 306 A.D.2d at 469, 761 N.Y.S.2d at 319 (quoting
Vinciguerra v. Vinciguerra, 294 A.D.2d 565, 566, 743 N.Y.S.2d 139, 140 (2d Dep’t
2002)).
117
Gilmartin v. Abbas, 60 A.D.3d 1058, 1058, 877 N.Y.S.2d 347, 348 (2d Dep’t
2009). See also, e.g., Timosa v. Chase, 21 A.D.3d 1115, 1116, 803 N.Y.S.2d 575, 576
(2d Dep’t 2005) (claiming that an accurate evaluation of the parties can best be made
by the trial court which has direct access to the parties and the ability to supplement
the information with whatever is necessary).
118
But cf. Anson v. Anson, 20 A.D.3d 603, 604, 798 N.Y.S.2d 185, 187 (3d Dep’t
2005) (claiming that in custody matters the Appellate Division’s authority is just as
broad as the trial court’s); Miller v. Pipia, 297 A.D.2d 362, 364, 746 N.Y.S.2d 729,
731 (2d Dep’t 2002) (quoting Rosiana C. v. Pierre S., 191 A.D.2d 432, 433, 594
N.Y.S.2d 316, 317 (2d Dep’t 1993)).
114
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III. HOW THE “BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD” RULE REALLY
WORKS
The “best interests of the child” rule is a rule easily stated
but much harder applied. A rule with no absolutes brings with it
a considerable amount of indeterminacy. The Legislature’s
intent in imposing such a broad standard was so that custody
could be determined according to the unique circumstances and
parties in each individual case.119 The Legislature may have
hoped that this broad standard would be applied in a more
particularized form, but New York’s current “best interests of the
child” rule has great potential to shy away from the kind of
“individualized justice that the system purports to deliver.”120

119
See Friederwitzer, 55 N.Y.2d at 93, 432 N.E.2d at 767, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 895;
see also Glendon, supra note 20, at 1167 (“Family law . . . is characterized by more
discretion than any other field of private law. This fact is typically explained by a
perceived need to tailor legal resolutions to the unique circumstances of each
individual and family.”). However, contrary to the Legislature’s implication, the
unique circumstances of each individual case could still be catered to with a less
arbitrary and indeterminate standard that relies on judges to discern how the “best
interests of the child” should be decided. The “child’s preference” factor, for example,
has “the appropriate mix of fixed and discretionary rules.” Id. at 1172. Courts have
been instructed to consider the desires and preferences of each child before deciding
custody. See Eschbach, 56 N.Y.2d at 173, 436 N.E.2d at 1263, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 661.
But, like the other “best interests” factors, the child’s preferences should not be
considered determinative. See Reed v. Reed, 189 Misc.2d 734, 738, 734 N.Y.S.2d 806,
809 (Sup. Ct. Richmond Cnty. 2001). When weighing the child’s preferences, “the
court must consider the age and maturity of the child and the potential for influence
having been exerted on the child.” Eschbach, 56 N.Y.2d at 173, 436 N.E.2d at 1263–
64, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 662; see also Cornell v. Cornell, 8 A.D.3d 718, 719, 778 N.Y.S.2d
193, 195 (3d Dep’t 2004) (noting that the advanced age of a child tends to render
greater weight to the child’s reasoned wishes). The court should be conscious of the
fact that the desires of children are capable of distortive manipulation by a parent.
See Nehra v. Uhlar, 43 N.Y.2d 242, 249, 372 N.E.2d 4, 7, 401 N.Y.S.2d 168, 171
(1977). Even with these limited guidelines a judge can better tailor custody outcomes
to individual situations while adhering to fixed rules of “best interests”
considerations.
120
Julie E. Artis, Judging the Best Interests of the Child: Judges’ Accounts of the
Tender Years Doctrine, 38 L. & SOC’Y REV. 769, 769 (2004) (quoting David M. v.
Margaret M., 385 S.E.2d 912, 919 (W. Va. 1989)) (expressing that no decision is
subject to more personal biases than a decision of joint custody; the decision may
hinge on the judge’s personal experiences or the judge’s feelings towards the parties
involved in the dispute).
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The Effects of an Indeterminate Standard on a Judge’s
Decision-Making Process

New York’s “best interests” of the child rule has one
fundamental flaw: It assumes that a judge could successfully
exercise his or her discretion in determining the best interests of
the child in the midst of trying to resolve how to apply the “best
interests” factors. As a result of trying to both make sense of the
current rule and understand the familial situation before them,
judges’ personal biases and value judgments could creep into
custody decisions. Generally, a judge may incorporate personal
inclinations in order to determine which of the recommended
factors to consider or use his or her predispositions to resolve
what weight to attribute to each recommended “best interests”
factor. This happens even more in cases in which a judge must
determine custody between two fit parents, making the
application of the “best interests” factors even more difficult.
However, regardless of whether both parents are found to be fit
or not, these issues often have the same insidious result on a
parent’s fundamental rights.
With these highly discretionary and imprecise rules, parents
are unable to ascertain or predict with any level of certainty their
“legal entitlements” to the care, custody, and control of their
children.121 Parents have no way of knowing what they could do
or refrain from doing that will bring them into conformity with
what is expected under the “best interests” of the child rule.
Moreover, parents are certainly not guaranteed that a judge’s
decision will actually reflect their legal entitlement to their
fundamental parental rights.
1.

Judges Choose How and What They Want To Consider

A judge’s unbridled discretion in custody disputes, in tandem
with the well-established rule that the “best interests” criteria
are guides and not absolute rules, has resulted in judges
considering some factors more than others, disregarding factors
121
Marsha Garrison, Reforming Divorce: What’s Needed and What’s Not, 27
PACE L. REV. 921, 925 (2007) (arguing that when legal rules are highly discretionary
and imprecise, they impair an individual’s ability to determine his or her legal
entitlements and reach mutual understanding about their entitlements). In essence,
no one involved in the dispute can predict with certainty what “best interests”
factors the judge will choose to consider or what weight the judge will attribute to
each factor on any given day.
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completely, or capriciously incorporating other considerations
that are not part of the often-cited recommended factors. The
extent to which New York’s “best interests” standard allows a
judge to exercise unrestrained discretion becomes evident after
reading custody decisions and analyzing why a judge ruled one
way over another. Because neither section 240 nor case law has
established the amount of weight that should be allotted to each
“best interests” factor, it is not uncommon practice for judges to
remain fixated on one factor and seemingly disregard the other
vital considerations.122
The Third Department specifically addressed this issue in
Cornell v. Cornell.123 In Cornell, the Third Department reversed
the family fourt’s improper alteration of an existing custody
arrangement.124 The family court, “[s]uggesting that the child’s
wishes—at the age of 15—would be dispositive,” based its
decision solely on the child’s desire to live with his father.125 The
lower court neither considered any evidence of the mother’s
allegations that the father was unfit nor did it take into account
any other “best interests” factors other than the child’s
preferences.
Similarly, in Chebuske v. Burnhard-Vogt, the Second
Department found that a family court’s decision resting solely on
the recommendations of the father’s expert witnesses lacked
sound and substantial basis in the record.126 The family court
placed “undue emphasis” on the recommendations of the father’s
expert witnesses who did not evaluate anything other than the
father’s fitness to serve as a custodial parent.127 Although in
Chebuske the Second Department recognized the lower court’s
unjustified emphasis on the father’s experts, too much deference
is often paid to lower court decisions based on the theory that
122
See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Guerra, 28 A.D.3d 775, 813 N.Y.S.2d 538 (2d Dep’t
2006) (reversing a family court decision that was based on the father’s work
schedule and did not take into consideration the child’s living situation with the
father’s parents, the separation of the child from her sisters, or the allegations of
domestic violence); Miller v. Pipia, 297 A.D.2d 362, 364–65, 746 N.Y.S.2d 729, 731–
32 (2d Dep’t 2002) (noting that the lower court did not credit any weight to the courtappointed expert’s evaluation of the parents, even though expert opinions are a
factor that should be considered in making custody determinations).
123
8 A.D.3d 718, 778 N.Y.S.2d 193 (3d Dep’t 2004).
124
Id. at 719–20, 778 N.Y.S.2d at 195–96.
125
Id. at 719, 778 N.Y.S.2d at 195.
126
284 A.D.2d 456, 457–58, 726 N.Y.S.2d 697, 699 (2d Dep’t 2001).
127
Id. at 458, 726 N.Y.S.2d at 699.
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these courts could and will thoroughly evaluate the character of
the parties and the individual circumstances of each case.128 In
reality, courts, like the family courts in Cornell and Chebuske,
are allocating whatever weight the judge sees fit to each vital
consideration and “improperly disregard[ing] the unequivocal
conclusions” that should have been drawn if the cases were
properly considered.129
The gaps in the “best interests” rule have also made custody
decisions pliable to a trial judge’s every inclination to take into
account factors beyond the recommended “best interests”
considerations, including a parent’s race, gender, sexual
orientation, and religion.130 Custody decisions that consider a
parent’s race are an example of judges’ wide-ranging ability to
incorporate whatever factors they see fit in their decisions.
Although not one of the often-cited factors, race has become a
quasi-factor that could be considered in determining what is in
the child’s best interests.131 Given the fact that judges resort to
the “best interests” criteria developed “through . . . litigation of
countless custody matters,”132 judges have blindly adopted race as
a factor without any regard to the constitutional issues that may
come attached.
As a “general rule,” New York courts have confirmed that a
judge may consider race in a dispute between biological parents
“for custody of an interracial child.”133 Although courts have
stated that race is not a controlling factor that could outweigh all
other considerations,134 it is not clear how or to what extent a
parent’s race should be considered.135 Judges who decide to take
128

See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
Chebuske, 284 A.D.2d at 457, 726 N.Y.S.2d at 699.
130
See Child Custody Relations, supra note 98, at 1338–45 for a discussion on
how factors unrelated to a state’s compelling interests, including race, religion, and
parental sexual habits, may form the basis of custody awards.
131
See Farmer v. Farmer, 109 Misc. 2d 137, 143–46, 439 N.Y.S.2d 584, 587–89
(Sup. Ct. Nassau Cnty. 1981). Under the equal protection doctrine, however, the
explicit use of racial criteria is subject to the strictest of scrutiny requiring a
compelling state objective. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (citing
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379
U.S. 184, 198 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
132
Custody and Visitation, supra note 19.
133
Farmer, 109 Misc. 2d at 144–46, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 588–89.
134
See id. at 145, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 588 (quoting Fountaine v. Fountaine, 133
N.E.2d 532, 534–35 (Ill. App. Ct. 1956)).
135
See Matter of Astonn H., Infant, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 1, 1995, at 33, col. 4 (Family
Ct. Kings Cnty.) (admitting that the court found “no cases that specifically address
129
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a parent’s race into account must draw speculative conclusions
regarding interracial relationships and may award custody to one
parent over the other not based on a “best interests” guideline
but, rather, based on the way they perceive the situation to be.
A parent who has not necessarily done anything wrong in
the past and would not be detrimental to the child’s future
development may be denied his or her fundamental right based
on a judge’s perception of a future interracial custodial
relationship. When dealing with racial issues, however, there
will not necessarily be specific past events that will aid in
predicting which parent will better serve the child’s best
interests. Judges draw generalized conclusions on how a child’s
race will affect the child in a certain number of years from now,
in fear that a child will not be able to identify with a parent of
the opposite race,136 or that a child will maintain one parent’s
racial identity over the other.137 But, “[g]eneralized assertions
based upon vague fears or even upon speculative probabilities
about the consequences of racial integration do not meet the
heavy burden of justification placed on the state when it employs
a racial classification.”138 In fact, general assertions about a
child’s welfare based on any one of a judge’s inclinations are not
sufficient to justify infringing on any fundamental right.139
Nonetheless, it does not appear as if the constitutional rights of
parents are even remotely considered when a judge chooses to
slip in race as a “best interests” consideration and decides
custody on a prediction of the future rather than on a parent’s
fitness.

the issue of race”; however, the court still considered race as one of the many factors
in determining custody).
136
See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 240 A.D.2d 928, 929, 658 N.Y.S.2d 548, 550 (3d
Dep’t 1997) (presuming that a child would not be denied his “biracial identity” by
living with his white mother rather than his African-American father because the
father would be entitled to “liberal visitation”); Olivier A. v. Christina A., 9 Misc. 3d
1104(A), 806 N.Y.S.2d 446 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk Cnty. 2005) (acknowledging that race
must be considered in order to fulfill the child’s need to maintain his “cultural
heritage and identity”).
137
See, e.g., Farmer, 109 Misc. 2d at 147, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 589–90 (considering
and ultimately rejecting, the father’s contention that, as the colored parent, he
should be awarded custody because society will perceive the child to be black).
138
Child Custody Relations, supra note 98, at 1341–42.
139
See supra Part I.B. for a discussion on the level of justification required to
infringe on a parent’s fundamental right to the care, custody, and control of his or
her child.
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Judge’s Use of Discretion When Neither Parent Is Found To
Be Unfit

Personal biases and value judgments are most evident in
decisions in which both parents are found to be fit parents yet
the judge still chooses to award exclusive custody to one parent.
When faced with more than one fit parent, “a prediction of which
claimant would be most likely to provide what is best for the
child is extremely difficult to make.”140 Courts will often inject
their subjective judgments concerning the “best interests” factors
in order to overcome this hurdle.
But these are the
circumstances where personal value judgments and biases
should be the least evident. If a court has found both parents to
be fit, then neither parent should be deprived of his or her
custodial right, especially if not based on strict “best interests”
considerations.
The King’s County Supreme Court in Finkelstein v.
Finkelstein, was faced with two fit parents during a custody
dispute involving a child diagnosed with Attention Deficit
Hyperactivity Disorder and Asperger’s Syndrome.141 The court
acknowledged the fact that “[b]oth parties are fit parents” and
“[e]ach demonstrates a loving, caring attitude towards [the
child],”142 yet still awarded sole custody to the mother. The court
seemed to have accredited its determination completely on the
child’s stability.143 While stability may be of paramount concern
when considering the custody of a special needs child, this does
not mean that other factors, such as each parent’s ability to
provide for the child’s emotional and intellectual development,
should be ignored. By granting sole custody to the mother, the
court restricted the father’s involvement in making decisions
concerning the child’s well-being and development. The father
specifically argued that the boy was going to need his father “on a
regular basis” in the future, especially when the circumstances

140

Robinson, supra note 14, at 59.
N.Y. L.J., May. 18, 1998, at 33, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1998).
142
Id.
143
See id. (focusing on the law guardian’s recommendation that sole custody to
the mother would better serve the child’s stability).
141
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became “more difficult.”144 The court, however, did not even
address the beneficial role the father, a responsible parent aware
of the care his son required,145 could play in his child’s life.
Similarly, in Chase v. Matanda-Chase, the Second
Department precisely found that “neither parent [was] unfit and
either would provide the child with a comfortable and loving
home,” but still affirmed the lower court’s decision granting the
father sole custody of the child.146 The court also put complete
emphasis on the child’s stability, without considering any of the
other recommended “best interests” factors.147 Holding that it
was not in the child’s best interest to disrupt his five-year living
arrangement with his father, the court took no consideration of
how the custody arrangement had and would affect the child’s
relationship with the mother, the quality of the father’s home
environment, or even the ability of the father to provide for the
child’s emotional and intellectual development.148 One would
think that where the court predominately based its decision on
the fact that the child was living with his father for five years, it
would evaluate the quality of the father’s home environment
throughout those years. The judge, however, remained fixated
on the child’s stability and justified the decision entirely on this
single consideration, without warranting the “fit” and “loving”
mother the due consideration she was entitled to.
In both Finkelstein and Chase, the courts did not consider
any other option other than sole custody,149 regardless of the fact
that neither parent was found to be unfit. The courts could have
maintained stability by awarding joint legal custody with
primary physical custody to one parent. Both fit parents would
have decision-making authority, but the child’s primary
residence would be with one parent in order to preserve the
child’s stability. In spite of both parents’ fitness, the courts
mentioned no alternative to sole custody as if the non-custodial
parent was unfit and a detriment to the child.

144

Id.
Id. The court ignored the father’s concerns about the child needing his father
in the future and just proceeded to consider the animosity between the parents.
146
41 A.D.3d 475, 475, 837 N.Y.S.2d 319, 320–21 (2d Dep’t 2007).
147
See id. at 475–76, 837 N.Y.S.2d at 320–21.
148
See id.
149
See id.; Finkelstein v. Finkelstein, N.Y. L.J., May. 18, 1998, at 33, col. 4 (Sup.
Ct. Kings County 1998).
145
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The problem with taking away a fit parent’s custodial right
goes far beyond a judge’s discretion to consider some factors and
not others. Given the heightened level of scrutiny required in
taking away a parent’s fundamental right, a judge must find that
joint custody would be harmful to the child in order to justify sole
custody.150 It is irrational that a court could find both that a
parent is fit and that the same parent’s involvement in the child’s
upbringing would be a detriment to the child to justify truncating
his or her custodial right.151 As noted by the Supreme Court
in Hodgson v. Minnesota, where the Court declared
unconstitutional a Minnesota statute that prohibited abortions to
women under the age of eighteen until forty-eight hours after
both of her parents were notified, a parent “who has
demonstrated sufficient commitment to his or her child[] is
thereafter entitled to raise the child[] free from undue state
interference.”152 Anything contrary to that is certainly at odds
with the Supreme Court’s inveterate presumption that “parents
act in their children’s best interests.”153 When a court decides to
take a fit parent’s custodial right away, the court is assuming
that any other finding the court makes is enough to rebut the
Supreme Court’s presumption that parents act in furtherance of
their child’s best interests. Moreover, courts are forgetting that a
custody decision is not an “award” to one parent; it is a
deprivation of a fundamental right to someone that was entitled
to that right all along.
3.

Lack of Relief on Appeal

The amount of deference appellate courts pay to lower court
custody decisions only acts to increase the chances that a
parent’s fundamental right to the care, custody, and control of his
150
See supra Part I.B for a discussion about how the constitution mandates a
finding that joint custody would be detrimental or harmful to the child before
granting exclusive legal custody to one parent and taking away the other parent’s
right to engage in the upbringing of his or her child.
151
In fact, the Supreme Court in Stanley v. Illinois recognized that “the State
registers no gain towards its declared goals when it separates children from the
custody of fit parents.” 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1972).
152
497 U.S. 417, 447 (1990). Simply because the parents’ decisions are not
agreeable does not automatically transfer from the parent to the state the power to
make decisions concerning the child. See id. at 484–85 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
153
See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 58 (2000) (citing Parham v. J.R., 442
U.S. 584, 602 (1979)); Parham, 442 U.S. at 602.
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or her child will be invalidly infringed upon. A trial court’s
custody determination will not be set aside unless it lacks a
sound and substantial basis on the record.154 Unlike other
appellate standards, courts considering an appeal from a prior
custody order must determine the substantiality of a lower
court’s decision without any objective scrutiny governing how
custody decisions should have been decided in the first place. A
trial judge, therefore, can allocate custody in whatever
arrangement he or she sees fit and that arrangement will only be
reversed if a parent has the ability to appeal, appeal is granted,
and the appellate court, without concrete criteria to evaluate the
lower court’s decision, finds that the judge arranged custody
without any substantial basis.
The presumption that only trial courts have the ability to
adequately evaluate the circumstances and parties of a case is an
extremely difficult hurdle to overcome on appeal. The court in
Chebuske v. Burnhard-Vogt shed light on the extent to which a
lower court must err for a decision to be overturned on appeal.155
In Chebuske, the Second Department properly took issue with
the fact that the family court completely disregarded the
conclusions and recommendations of a court appointed forensic
examiner, “the only disinterested party” in the case, and placed
undue emphasis on the father’s expert witness’s unfounded
recommendations when deciding to grant exclusive custody to the
father.156 Apparently, a lower court’s complete disregard of
conclusions and recommendations and its undue emphasis on the
unfounded conclusions is the degree of error required for a
custody decision to be overturned.157 Appellate judges essentially
must be reluctant to second-guess a trial court’s custody decision

154

See supra Part II for a discussion about the amount of deference appellate
courts should pay to trial court custody decisions.
155
284 A.D.2d 456, 726 N.Y.S.2d 697 (2d Dep’t 2001).
156
Id. at 457–58, 726 N.Y.S.2d at 699.
157
An appellate court, generally, cannot reverse a lower court’s custody decision
unless the lower court has exercised its discretion based on “some wrong general
principle or taken an inappropriate factor into account.” Robert H. Mnookin, ChildCustody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 254 (1975).
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unless something completely outrageous appears in the record;
they must consider an appeal with the mindset that the lower
court rightfully decided custody.158
Lower court judges, however, rely on case-by-case
adjudication to give content to the “best interests” standard.
Therefore, as illustrated by the courts’ yielding adoption of race
as a “best interests” consideration,159 there are minimal
justifications for appellate relief based on the fact that a trial
judge exceeded his or her authority.160 On appeal, a court is not
even justified to reverse a custody decision on the grounds that
any one factor was not considered.161 The ill-defined “best
interests” standard ultimately functions to protect custody
decisions from being overturned on appeal. As a matter of fact,
judges have even acknowledged this protection and have used it
to justify custody decisions based on factors other than the child’s
best interests.162
B.

The Effects of a Broken System on Determining What Is in
the Best Interests of the Child

All the problems associated with the “best interests” rule—
its intrinsic vagueness, its lack of definite considerations, and its
susceptibility to personal biases—are further exacerbated by the
158
See Eschbach v. Eschbach, 56 N.Y.2d 167, 173, 436 N.E.2d 1260, 1264, 451
N.Y.S.2d 658, 662 (1982) (requiring that appellate courts be “reluctant to substitute
their own evaluation of [the] subjective factors” for that of the trial court). “In
matters of this character the findings of the nisi prius court must be accorded the
greatest respect.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing In re Irene O., 38
N.Y.2d 776, 777, 345 N.E.2d 337, 337, 381 N.Y.S.2d 865, 865 (1975)).
159
See supra Part III.A.1.
160
See Child Custody Relations, supra note 98, at 1327–28 (suggesting that one
of the limited justifications for intervention on the ground that the state exceeded its
parens patriae power is “when custody is awarded on the basis of a factor that is
suspect for special reasons—for example, the gender or race of the parent”); see also
Mnookin, supra note 157, at 250–54 (suggesting that because the “best interests”
standard depends on “person-oriented” rather than on “act-oriented” determinations,
on predictions rather than past events, and on interdependent factors, appellate
review is sharply limited).
161
See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
162
See Artis, supra note 120, at 791 (noting that only a few judges find “best
interests” criteria useful, but that several judges use the criteria as a tool to justify
their custody decisions). One judge inadvertently admitted to being able to find facts
and make them fit with the law if he has to. See id. And, similarly, another judge
contended that judges “can do just about anything [they] want to, and if the judge
spends a little time writing [a custody decision], whatever decision [the judge]
make[s] will be upheld on appeal.” Id.
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inadequacies of the New York courts that are responsible for
resolving custody disputes. The troublesome systemic conditions
surrounding custody proceedings are not a secret to either the
public or the administrators;163 the “players themselves
acknowledge that the system often works badly or barely works
at all.”164 This Section aims to elucidate the effects of New York’s
court system on determining what is in the best interests of the
child. Specifically, this Section will address the shortcomings of
both New York family and supreme courts, not as a
recommendation for sweeping changes in the court systems, but
rather to prove the realities of implementing such an unworkable
custody standard.
The lack of sufficient resources in both the supreme courts
and the family courts has a damaging effect on determining what
is in the best interests of a child. These “regularly overcrowded”
courts,165 with limited court resources,166 create a substantial
obstacle for judges to efficiently and effectively determine the
child’s best interests. Custody decisions take a lot more time
than required,167 judges are often reassigned in the middle,168 and
“[t]he overlapping jurisdiction of these [two] courts often causes
duplication and confusion, adding cost, delay and trauma to such
proceedings.”169 As a result, judges cannot devote the necessary

163
See Joe Sexton, Opening the Doors on Family Court’s Secrets, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 13, 1997, at 1.
164
Id.
165
Matrimonial Commission Report, supra note 28, at 1019; see also Susan R.
Larabee, Providing Resources to Family Courts, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 24, 2003, at 2 (noting
that in 2002, Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye reports the state’s family courts handled
over 700,000 cases with fewer than 140 judges); Peggy Farber, Family Court Fiasco,
GOTHAM GAZETTE, June 1, 2000, available at http://www.gothamgazette.com/
article/children/20000601/2/110 (“[On] a typical day at Queens Family Court . . . over
one hundred people [are] waiting in the second floor reception area for their cases to
be called by one of five judges holding court on that floor that day.”); Sexton, supra
note 163 (describing one judge’s Monday morning in Kings County Family Court,
with the day’s calendar holding fifty cases and requiring “for each case: city lawyers,
child welfare caseworkers, parents and court-appointed lawyers”).
166
See Matrimonial Commission Report, supra note 28, at 1019–21 (including
inadequate courtroom space, inappropriate physical facilities, insufficient resources
to cope with the volume and seriousness of the caseloads involved, and limited
assistance).
167
See, e.g., Chebuske v. Burnhard-Vogt, 284 A.D.2d 456, 457, 726 N.Y.S.2d
697, 698 (2d Dep’t 2001) (acknowledging that the custody hearing was conducted
over sixteen months).
168
See Matrimonial Commission Report, supra note 28, at 1018.
169
Id. at 1033.
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amount of time to consider and analyze the “numerous and
diverse” issues concerning custody disputes.170 Judges rely on
short cuts to accelerate the process and substitute for the
insufficient resources they are provided with. And, if need be,
judges—as the sole arbiters entrusted with full discretion to
determine custody disputes—can even rely on their own
subjective judgments to short-cut the decision-making process.
To make matters worse, under the current administration of
custody disputes, judges are often not offered the proper training
and education required to make them “knowledgeable and
experienced in the area of law.”171 As noted by the Matrimonial
Commission, the “timely, accurate and just disposition of
[familial dispute] cases depends, to a great degree, on the
knowledge, character, temperament, professional aptitude and
experience of the judge before whom the matter is presented.”172
It is essential that a judge is “knowledgeable about statutory and
case law” and that “he or she receive[s] a strong, basic education”
in family law practice and the administration of a courtroom and
case management.173 While all judges already receive extensive
and ongoing continuing education in both the supreme and
family courts,174 there is additional “highly specialized education
Without this
and training” that a judge must receive.175
specialized training, judges who have unbridled discretion at
their fingertips may lack the guidance and experience required to

170
See id. at 1019–21; see also Sexton, supra note 163 (quoting a senior Legal
Aid lawyer in Manhattan who has reservations about the decisions family court
judges make “based on what they see in the five seconds they look up”); John
Sullivan, Chief Judge Announces Plan To Streamline Family Court, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 25, 1998, at B7 (noting that in 1997, Kings County Family Court “cases
receive[d] an average of slightly over four minutes before a judge on the first
appearance, and little more than 11 minutes on subsequent appearances”).
171
Matrimonial Commission Report, supra note 28, at 1021. The Commission
noted that while it may be desirable to assign judges who have knowledge and
experience in the area of law, “the realities of judicial administration do not always
make this possible.” Id.
172
Id.
173
Id. at 1021–22.
174
See id. at 1022.
175
Id. The Commission has recommended that a new judge receive an
expanded, four-week education program including a course in “substantive and
procedural law” and a week spent integrating and transitioning into his or her
respective district. Id. at 1023.
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exercise that discretion in the child’s best interests. This imposes
a risk on parents who are trying to maintain custody of their
children.
When cases are decided in an overcrowded and ill-equipped
system by judges who may or may not have been properly
trained, the only logical conclusion that follows is that these
decisions do not always duly consider the facts of each individual
case and the character and sincerity of the parties as purported
by the boilerplate recitation of the “best interests” rule. Custody
disputes are not provided with the “close monitoring and followup” they require.176 The system operates to “undermine the
[c]ourt’s ability to fulfill its promise” and protect parents’
fundamental rights.177
IV. JOINT CUSTODY: THE BEST SOLUTION
It is evident that there are many shortcomings in New York’s
“best interests of the child” rule. These issues range from the
actual rule itself, to the system in charge of implementing the
rule, to the circumstances under which a child’s best interests
must be decided. The state’s role of determining what custody
arrangement will best promote the child’s interests is
compromised by these issues and, as a result, so is the state’s
right to truncate a parent’s fundamental right to the care,
custody, and control of his or her child. It may seem as if the
best solution to resolve the flaws of New York’s “best interests of
the child” rule would be to either create a clearer, more definitive
standard, with absolute factors that must be considered, or to
modify the workings of the courts responsible for determining
custody; both solutions involve changes that certainly must be
made. This Note, however, proposes a solution that goes beyond
simply patching up some problems. It recommends that the best
means of promoting both the welfare of the child and the
protection of a parent’s fundamental right is for the Legislature
to adopt a presumption in favor of joint custody. Under a
presumption of joint custody, a court would only be allowed to
order sole custody if a joint custodial relationship would be
detrimental to the child. A court would not be justified in
176

See id. at 1019.
See Leah A. Hill, Do You See What I See? Reflections on How Bias Infiltrates
the New York City Family Court—The Case of the Court Ordered Investigation, 40
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 527, 531 (2007).
177
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granting sole custody on the grounds that the parents
demonstrated a high level of acrimony during the custody
dispute; rather, the real concern will be whether the parents are
capable of putting aside their differences and working together.
A.

The Presumption Defined

A presumption in favor of joint custody would be exactly
that: Judges would have to presume that joint legal custody
must be awarded to both parents unless there is a compelling
reason why there should not be joint custody.178 Absent a
compelling justification, both parents would maintain their
decision-making authority over issues concerning their child’s
upbringing. This presumption would be in line with the Supreme
Court’s long-standing presumption that parents act in the best
interests of their children179 and would adequately protect a
child’s best interests without unduly encroaching on a parent’s
fundamental right. It would coalesce New York’s current rule
that there is “no prima facie right to the custody of the child in
either parent”180 with the state’s purpose under the doctrine of
parens patriae181 and, in effect, would operate to restrain the
court from granting either parent the right to sole custody unless
the state has a compelling justification to protect a child from a
detriment or harm to the child’s health and safety.
Absent a detriment or harm to a child, the state would not be
justified in awarding sole custody to one parent.
Any
justification a state might have in stripping a parent of his or her
custodial rights stems from the “role of the state as sovereign in
child custody determinations, when acting on behalf of
178

Under this presumption, a court, recognizing that every family’s
circumstances are unique, will have to order a joint custody arrangement conducive
to the particular familial situation and not pigeonhole all joint custody
arrangements.
179
See supra note 153 and accompanying text. The initial burden would
continue to be on the state to disprove that a parent is not acting in the child’s best
interests. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68–70 (2000). As the Court noted in
Troxel, the weight should not be on the parent to disprove that a certain
arrangement would not be in the best interests of his or her child. See id. at 69.
180
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 70 (West, Westlaw through L.1988).
181
In Santosky v. Kramer, the Supreme Court, while discussing the state’s
interest in terminating a parent’s custodial rights, explicitly stated that “while there
is still reason to believe that positive, nurturing parent-child relationships exist, the
parens patriae interest favors preservation, not severance, of natural familial
bonds.” 455 U.S. 745, 766–67 (1982).
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the . . . interests of a child.”182 In light of the fundamental
interest at stake, there are “fairly tight limits on the exercise of
the parens patriae power.”183 A state, acting under the penumbra
of parens patriae, is only allowed to limit this right when there is
a compelling state interest. Specifically, where there may be
evidence that a custodial arrangement will jeopardize the health
or safety of the child, the doctrine of parens patriae may usurp a
parent’s childrearing right.184
Judges will have to be wary of factual evidence that indicates
a potential harm to the child. Contrary to the courts’ implication
that the “best interests of the child” rule provides the most
precision possible,185 evidence of specific situations that would
actually harm a child is usually “much easier for a court to
identify and evaluate than those factors that would result in the
best possible environment for a child, because the probable
harmful effects may be much more readily apparent.”186 There
are, for example, certain obvious symptoms that a judge could
observe and easily identify indicating whether a child is being
provided adequate medical care and attention, adequate food,
shelter, and clothing, and adequate parental supervision.187
Without an overt showing of potential harm, a judge’s decision to
truncate a parent’s right to the care, custody, and control of his
or her child is much more speculative. A biased weighing of “best
interests” factors, that do not necessarily determine whether a
parent is fit to be a custodial parent, is far from a compelling
reason to override the joint custody presumption.
Requiring that there be a potential detriment or harm to the
child in order to grant exclusive legal custody to one parent is not
a concept so far-stretched.
Many state legislatures have
explicitly directed courts to favor joint custody.188 The Florida
182
See Danice M. Kowalczyk, Lizzie’s Law: Healing the Scars of Domestic
Murder—An Emerging National Model, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 1241, 1243 n.18 (1998).
183
Child Custody Relations, supra note 98, at 1319.
184
See Kowalczyk, supra note 181, at 1260.
185
See In re Adoption of J.S.R., 374 A.2d 860, 863 (D.C. 1977).
186
Robinson, supra note 14, at 61.
187
Id.
188
See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3040 (West 1997) (mandating that an award to
both parents be first in order of preference for custody decisions); CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 3080 (West 1993) (requiring that there is a presumption that joint custody is in the
best interests of the child); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56a (West 2005) (stating
that “[t]here shall be a presumption, affecting the burden of proof, that joint custody
is in the best interests of a minor child”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-717B (West 1994);
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Legislature, for example, has overtly designated a presumption
in favor of joint custody unless there is a showing of some
detriment to the child. The Florida statute orders “parental
responsibility for a minor child be shared by both parents unless
the court finds that shared parental responsibility would be
detrimental to the child.”189 Florida’s statute has set a strict
requirement of detriment before a court could find that joint
custody is inappropriate.190 The Florida courts have defined
detriment to mean “circumstances that produce or are likely to
produce lasting mental, physical or emotional harm.”191
Detriment is more than “trauma caused to a child by uprooting
him from familiar surroundings”; it “contemplates a longer term
adverse effect that transcends the normal adjustment period.”192
Under Florida law a parent’s right fails to evaporate merely
because he or she has not been an ideal parent.193 Considering
the “best interest of the child . . . does not obviate the necessity of
a specific finding that shared parental responsibility would be
detrimental to the child.”194 A “best interests” finding is not
equivalent to a finding that shared parental responsibility would
be detrimental to the child. In Grimaldi v. Grimaldi, for
example, a Florida District Court of Appeals in affirming a prior
joint custody order held that finding that a mother was not
capable of exercising parental responsibility due to an illness was
not the same as finding that shared responsibility would be
detrimental to the child.195 Just because a trial court assumes
that it is in the best interests of the child for one parent to have

MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-5-24 (West 2003) (placing joint legal custody as first
preference in custody decisions); MO. ANN. STAT. § 452.375 (West 2011); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 125.490 (West 1981) (stating that there is a presumption that joint
custody is in child’s best interests); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9.1 (West 1999) (“There
shall be a presumption that joint custody is in the best interests of a child in an
initial custody determination.”); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 107.105 (West 2008).
189
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(2) (West 2010).
190
See Maslow v. Edwards, 886 So.2d 1027, 1028 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
191
In re Marriage of Matzen, 600 So.2d 487, 490 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
192
Id. (citations omitted).
193
See id. (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982)).
194
Maslow, 886 So.2d at 1028.
195
721 So.2d 820, 821–22 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
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primary custody, it still must make a specific finding that shared
parental responsibility would be detrimental to the child before
granting sole custody to one parent.196
Similar to the Florida statute, under the proposed joint
custody presumption, the state would be the final arbiter of
whether there is a compelling justification to grant sole or joint
custody. The joint custody presumption should not be eliminated
solely on the grounds that a parent is requesting sole custody.197
Even if one or both parents are seeking sole custody, the court
should still undertake the dispute with the presumption that
joint custody should be granted. A state can, in no way,
eliminate the burden of proving a compelling interest based
solely on a parent’s request.198 This is especially true because
parents are permitted to request sole custody without presenting
any specific reasons for rejecting joint custody or any “special
factors that might warrant the conclusion that joint custody is
not in the best interests of the child.”199 Absent a burden on the
state to prove a compelling justification, a state would effectively
be able to take away a parent’s fundamental right through a
foregone conclusion that one parent will have their decisionmaking right truncated regardless of the state’s justification for
doing so. Therefore, regardless of what each parent claims, a
court must always assume the responsibility of determining
whether there are compelling reasons to do away with the
presumption and award sole custody to one parent.
B.

Acrimony Looked at from a Different Perspective

The acrimony between the parents would still be a vital
consideration in deciding whether there may be a potential
detriment to the child and, therefore, a sufficient reason to
196
See Maslow, 886 So.2d at 1028 (stating explicitly that “utilizing the best
interest of the child standard does not obviate the necessity of a specific finding that
shared parental responsibility would be detrimental to the child before awarding
sole parental responsibility to a parent”).
197
Granted, if a parent persists with the current “all or nothing” approach of
custody and would rather not have any custody over his or her child than to share
joint custody with the other parent, a court acting under the joint custody
presumption should not impose on that parent a joint custodial arrangement.
198
See James W. Bozzomo, Joint Legal Custody: A Parent’s Constitutional Right
in a Reorganized Family, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 547, 559 (2002) (stating that when
dealing with a fundamental right, any infringement on that right imposes on the
state the burden to show that there is a compelling justification for doing so).
199
Id. at 570.
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supersede the presumption in favor of joint custody.200 For joint
legal custody to be successful, parents must be able to get along
and communicate about issues regarding their child’s welfare.
Judges, however, would be neither permitted nor justified in
blindly accepting the acrimony they see before them during a
custody dispute to rationalize granting sole legal custody. Of real
concern is not whether the parents’ relationship appears to be so
discordant at the time of litigation to award sole custody, but,
rather, whether the parents are capable of putting aside their
differences and working together to engage in joint decisionmaking with respect to their child’s upbringing and prevent any
foreseen detriment or harm to their child.201
The mere fact that parents are so acrimonious during a
custody disputes does not mean that a cooperative joint custody
arrangement is not feasible. The reason parents come to court to
resolve contested custody issues may range amongst many
different reasons. For instance, parents who have never been
married may seek a judicial decree to resolve the problems they
are having over an existing custodial arrangement,202 “former
spouses [may seek] to modify a prior child custody order,”203 or
spouses who have filed for divorce may contest custody as a
tangential issue of the divorce.204 Clearly, parents have some
underlying issues between themselves before even entering the

200
Currently, “joint custody is encouraged primarily as a voluntary alternative
for relatively stable, amicable parents behaving in mature civilized fashion.”
Braiman v. Braiman, 44 N.Y.2d 584, 589–90, 378 N.E.2d 1019, 1021, 407 N.Y.S.2d
449, 451 (1978); see also Thompson v. Thompson, 267 A.D.2d 516, 518, 699 N.Y.S.2d
181, 184 (3d Dep’t 1999); Trolf v. Trolf, 126 A.D.2d 544, 544, 510 N.Y.S.2d 666, 667
(2d Dep’t 1987).
201
See Trolf, 126 A.D.2d at 544, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 667 (rationalizing that a
judge’s real concern in deciding custody is how capable parents are of “cooperating in
making decisions on matters relating to the care and welfare of the children”); see,
e.g., Somerville v. Somerville, 307 A.D.2d 481, 483, 761 N.Y.S.2d 747, 749 (3d Dep’t
2003) (finding that although the record reflected the “parties’ apparent disdain for
one another,” that does not necessarily establish that the parents were so severely
embattled that they could not communicate in reasonable fashion for their child’s
benefit).
202
See Rosenthal, supra note 12, at 131–32. The existing custodial arrangement
could be a modification from a past judicial decree or one that the parents have
implemented on their own, without judicial intervention, or from an actual legal
agreement.
203
Id.
204
See supra note 27.

FINAL_LAPSATIS

2012]

2/21/2013 12:39 PM

IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF NO ONE

709

courtroom; however, the embittered relationships evident during
custody disputes are circumstances to a great extent fueled by
the “traditional emphasis on exclusive custody” to one parent.205
When considering whether to grant sole custody, a judge
would need to account for the fact that the animosity evident in
custody disputes is largely due to the “winner take all” mentality
that has become embedded in New York custody disputes.206 The
current system pits one parent against the other and forces them
to battle out issues of custody. A parent is put in the position,
whether he or she truly believes it or not, to voice the other
parent’s every imperfection, in hopes of persuading the court and
gaining an advantage in the litigation.207 Parents have no
incentive to admit to the other parent’s strengths or the benefits
he or she can provide to the child when they have no idea how
that admission will be considered by the court. This “winner
take all” frame of mind will possibly persist through a new joint
custody presumption, ultimately making it appear as if the
hostility between the parents is at an even higher level than it
actually is.
The high level of acrimony during custody proceedings,
however, may be temporary and may likely wane as time passes.
Parents come to court and seek judicial intervention to solve
their impasse in order to move forward in their lives.208 It has
been argued that “[t]he very fact that both parents want custody
badly enough to litigate for it suggests that,” when push comes to
shove, they may be “willing to work to minimize their conflicts
with each other in order to retain custody.”209 The apparent
discord between the parents during litigation may offer little

205

Robinson, supra note 14, at 30.
Id.; see also New York State Assembly, Memorandum in Support of
Legislation, B. 4559, 232d Leg. (2009) (advocating for a presumption in favor of
shared parenting of children in matrimonial proceedings because sole custody
generates “an adversarial forum where one side defaults and the other, allowing a
‘winner’ and a ‘loser’ to be declared”) [hereinafter MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
LEGISLATION]; Bozzomo, supra note 198, at 578; Rosenthal, supra note 12, at 140
(arguing that the litigation process of custody disputes “exacerbates acrimony
between parties”).
207
See Bozzomo, supra note 198, at 578 (stating that parents have an incentive
to “introduce very personal and damaging evidence against the other parent” in
order to convince the court that they should be awarded exclusive custody).
208
See id. at 576 (“Often, the reason why couples seek judicial intervention is to
solve the . . . problems so that they can move their lives along and end the conflict.”).
209
Child Custody Relations, supra note 98, at 1330.
206
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indication of whether “both parties are fit and loving parents,
possess a desire to share in the upbringing of their children and
have demonstrated a willingness and ability to set aside their
personal differences and work together for the good of their
children.”210 Therefore, fleeting acrimony, even if extreme, is far
from a sufficient reason to curtail a parent’s fundamental right.
C.

Still in the Best Interests of the Child

A presumption that absent a compelling justification a court
should award joint custody to both parents would not only be in
line with constitutional mandate, it would operate to preserve
the best interests of the child. As explained, even under a
presumption in favor of joint custody, if joint custody would prove
to be detrimental to a child, sole custody should and will be
granted. Without a potential detriment or harm, however, a joint
custodial relationship will be in the best interests of the child.
Shared parenting is in a child’s best interest where the
relationship between the parents and the child is free from
abuse, neglect, domestic violence, and other harmful
circumstances.211 Unlike sole custody, under joint custody both
parents have a right to engage in the upbringing of the child and
feel as significant in the child’s life as the other “because there is
presumably no grave disparity between [the parents] regarding
their authority.”212 As a result, parents feel less as if they are in
a constant battle to get the upper hand over the other parent’s
involvement in the child’s upbringing. Rather, parents make
decisions and undertake the caretaking responsibility jointly.
Both parents play a significant role in their child’s life and
development.213 Thus, “maximiz[ing] the child’s physical and

210

Palmer v. Palmer, 223 A.D.2d 944, 945, 637 N.Y.S.2d 225, 226 (3d Dep’t

1996).
211
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF LEGISLATION, supra note 206, at 4559
(“Shared parenting, where both parents share as equally as possible in the legal
responsibility, living experience, and physical care of the child, has been found to be
in child’s best interest . . . [w]here the relationship between the parent(s) and
child(ren) is free from domestic violence, abuse, neglect and other harmful
circumstances.”).
212
Jo-Ellen Paradise, The Disparity Between Men and Women in Custody
Disputes: Is Joint Custody the Answer to Everyone’s Problems?, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
517, 567 (1998).
213
Id. at 566.
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emotional access to both parents in meaningful, day-to-day
interaction, and help[ing] the child to see both parents as sources
of love and security and as positive role models.”214
Joint custody also works to maximize a child’s stability.
When one parent is assigned sole legal custody, the other parent
is “reduced to a peripheral ‘visitor’ status” and, as a “standard,”
granted limited visitation.215 A joint custodial arrangement, on
the other hand, permits greater contact with both parents and
eliminates the risk of damaging effects from a parent
withdrawing from the child’s life after the custody litigation.216
Children recognize that they can turn to either parent for advice
and regularly interact with both parents.217 As the father in
Finkelstein indicated, a child may be more inclined to consult
with one parent about certain issues.218 Mr. Finkelstein’s son, for
example, would benefit from consulting his father, a male, as the
boy grows up and his life “get[s] more difficult.”219 A child’s
needs, however, are not limited to consulting a parent of the
same sex; a child may feel a greater sense of comfort speaking
and getting advice from a specific parent but may not have the
option to do so in a sole custody arrangement. Joint custody, on
the other hand, reduces the child’s feelings of rejection and
abandonment and “is conducive to the child’s emotional
stability.”220
In the event that a situation does arise where a courtordered joint custodial relationship turns out to be a detriment to
the child’s well-being, at that point a parent’s fundamental right
to the care, custody, and control of his or her child will have to
yield to the child’s interests. The court may be to blame for not
properly considering any potential detriment to the child or the
parents may be at fault for making decisions that turn out to be
harmful to the child’s well-being. Regardless of who is to blame,
214

Robinson, supra note 14, at 32.
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF LEGISLATION, B. 4559, 232d Leg. (2009).
216
See Robinson, supra note 14, at 33.
217
Paradise, supra note 212, at 572–73.
218
See Finkelstein v. Finkelstein, N.Y. L.J., May 18, 1998, at 33, col. 4 (Sup. Ct.
Kings Cnty. 1998).
219
See id.
220
H. Jay Folberg & Marva Graham, Joint Custody of Children Following
Divorce, 12 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 523, 557 (1979). In fact, children tend to show a great
desire to continue existing relationships with their parents. See id. A child’s desire to
continue having both parents in his or her life does not automatically disappear
because the parents have decided to end their relationship.
215
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if such a situation arises, the parents do have the option to
request a modification from the court. In Hugh L. v. Fhara L.,221
for instance, the father received a modification from a prior
custody order that awarded the parents joint “legal decisionmaking responsibility.”222 The Bronx County Supreme Court
noted the troubling traits of both parents but still found that
joint decision-making responsibility would “advance the best
interests of the child.”223 The lower court, acting under New
York’s “best interests of the child” rule, did not find any potential
detriment to the boy’s physical or mental health resulting from
each parent’s troubling traits. The First Department’s rationale
for granting a modification, on the other hand, was based on
specific detriments that a joint custodial relationship posed on
the child’s well-being. The mother posed a risk of physical harm
to the child by failing to cooperate with medical professionals,224
opposing counseling for the child,225 and obstructing the father’s
relationship with his son.226 The father, conversely, had made
progress in becoming a better parent and in addressing any
shortcomings he may have had.227 It was only the “passage of
time” and the “development of a fuller record” that permitted the
First Department to accurately assess the risk of joint custody.228
But if at any time joint custody proves to be detrimental to the
child’s well-being, a modification could and should be granted.

221
44 A.D.3d 192, 840 N.Y.S.2d 352 (1st Dep’t 2007). Although this case
involved incidents of domestic violence, which the father pleaded guilty to, id. at 194
n.1, 840 N.Y.S.2d at 353 n.1, the court’s reasoning for granting a modification was
not based on the domestic violence because there had been no recurrence of the
domestic violence from the time of the initial custody order, and there was no
evidence that the father had ever been abusive towards his son. Id. at 197, 840
N.Y.S.2d at 356.
222
Hugh L. v. Fhara L., N.Y. L.J., June 1, 2000, at 29, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. Bronx
Cnty. 2000).
223
Id.
224
Hugh L., 44 A.D.3d at 197, 840 N.Y.S.2d at 356. The mother preferred her
own diagnoses to those of medical professionals, and was careless about filling and
dispensing her child’s prescriptions. See id. at 197–98, 840 N.Y.S. at 356.
225
Id. at 197, 840 N.Y.S.2d at 355 (pointing out that the mother refused to
acknowledge her own deficiencies and accept that counseling would serve to benefit
her child).
226
Id. at 198, 840 N.Y.S.3d at 356.
227
Id.
228
Id.
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The likely administrative and cost burdens that may be
imposed on courts as a result of parents seeking a modification of
a prior joint custody order are not sufficient reasons for New
York not to adopt a joint custody presumption. Critics of joint
custody argue that it may increase a court’s burden because
parents may have to return to court and request the court to
modify custody orders when joint custody turns out to be
unsuccessful.229 True, if joint custody proves to be unsuccessful, a
judge will have to hear one more case and decide one more
request, but a joint custody presumption may actually serve to
decrease the courts’ overall burden. Parents, knowing that a
court must presume that joint custody is in the best interests of
the child when there is no evidence of a potential detriment to
the child’s well-being, may be less inclined to come to court and
litigate custody. Parents will have little incentive to try and
litigate for sole custody when a joint custodial relationship is
feasible and will ultimately be in the child’s best interests, in
effect decreasing the number of custody cases the courts will
need to hear. More importantly, a fundamental right cannot be
infringed upon merely because it may be administratively more
efficient and less costly to decide issues concerning that right
another way.230 A state is not justified in retaining a statutory
scheme that unjustifiably deprives individuals of their
fundamental rights in order to minimize costs and burdens.
CONCLUSION
A presumption in favor of joint custody must be adopted to
adequately protect a parent’s fundamental right to the care,
custody, and control of his or her child. The United States
Supreme Court has recognized a parent’s right to retain custody
of his or her child as fundamental in nature. The Court intended
to protect the “the private realm of family life”231 and to ensure
that parent’s are involved in the upbringing of their children.232
229

See Rosenthal, supra note 12, at 150 (noting that critics of joint custody
argue that people may have to come back to court to file violations or requests to
modify custody orders, which may “clog up the judicial system”).
230
See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76–77 (1971) (holding that a state
violated the Fourteenth Amendment when it adopted a statute that gave a
mandatory preference to people of a certain sex, merely to eliminate hearings on the
merits).
231
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
232
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 401 (1923).
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In line with the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, a
joint custody presumption would require the court to find that
joint custody cannot be granted without a state’s compelling
interest to protect against a detriment or harm to the child’s
physical or mental well-being.
The role of custody courts must be more than weeding
through an ill-defined “best interests” rule that does not
necessarily protect a child’s well-being. The courts, acting on
behalf of the state, have a vital interest in ensuring that a child’s
relationship and bond with his or her parent is not aimlessly
broken. This involves more than an arbitrary and systematically
biased application of random, judicially created “best interests”
factors. In order for courts to safeguard the best interests of the
child and protect the rights of parents, the New York courts and
Legislature must accept the long-overdue recognition that shared
parenting is in a child’s best interests. Moreover, both the
Legislature and the courts need to recognize that the constitution
mandates nothing short of a detrimental impact on the child’s
well-being in order to trump a parent’s right to joint custody and
shared parenting.

